

UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

22 December 1952

Dear Mr. Spingarn:

Thank you very much for your letter of 3 December advising me of your work and interest in the Counter Intelligence Corps. I regret that my extended absence out of the country has prohibited me from replying as soon as I would have liked, and I am grateful for the opportunity to furnish the following information.

You are correct in assuming that some of the points outlined in the resolutions you submitted in 1948 have been implemented, but that certain other features have not. I can assure you that these latter features have not been overlooked, but that the operational structure of the Army and the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps have prohibited their adoption. In this connection, I know that, through your continuing association with the CIC Center, you are well aware of the progress made by the CIC from the standpoint of both operations and organization.

Among these ideas advanced by you in your resolutions, the following -- either in whole or in part -- are now in effect:

Establishment of a Central CIC File.  
Authority for civilian status of CIC personnel.  
Improvement of the CIC T/O&E.  
Improvement of the CIC training program.


This progress is the result of considerable research, planning, and implementation on the part of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The fact that they coincide with many features outlined in your resolutions of 1948 is a tribute to the sound thinking of both yourself and the staff of the Counter Intelligence Corps Center.

I hope that the foregoing will be valuable to you in your future work in this vital matter, and I want you to know that your continued interest in the activities and future of the Counter Intelligence Corps is deeply appreciated.

JCS review(s)  
completed.

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn  
Commissioner  
Federal Trade Commission  
Washington 25, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

  
RECEIVED

REC 24 1952  
STEPHEN J. SPINGARN

Dear General Collins:

In the Spring of 1948, I submitted to General Gruenther, who was then Staff Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a lengthy paper making extensive recommendations for improving the organization and operations of military counter intelligence.

On July 19, 1948, a staff subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a hearing on my recommendations at which I testified. As I recall, a Colonel Tracy was the chairman of that subcommittee. On October 7, 1948, General Gruenther sent me a letter, a copy of which I attach, saying that the study of my recommendations had been completed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and would now be considered by the individual services. He stated, "I am confident that a material improvement will result which will add significantly to our national set-up."

I have continued my interest in counter intelligence since the war. I am a member of the Board of Governors of the National Counter Intelligence Corps Association, which is an alumni group of some 5,000 CIC veterans. That Association's National Program in the Counter Intelligence Policy Field was drafted by me and approved unanimously by the Association at its 1948 convention. It re-endorsed this program at its August 1952 convention.

I contemplate doing some more study and work in this field, but in order to do so, I need an authoritative statement from you indicating to what extent the recommendations made by me in 1948 through General Gruenther are now in effect.

I personally feel that the recommendations which I made with respect to the establishment of a central file, the recommendation with respect to a better table of organization, the recommendation as to how CIC instruction and indoctrination could be improved and perhaps some of the other recommendations made by me have, at least to some extent, been adopted and put into effect. However, this is only speculation on my part based on occasional visits to CIC Headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland.

I would greatly appreciate an authoritative statement on this subject since it would be of much value to me in connection with my future work in this field.

For your information, I am attaching a personal history statement, the latter part of which covers my military record.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Spingarn.

General J. Lawton Collins,  
Chief of Staff,  
Department of the Army,  
Pentagon Building,  
Washington 25, D. C.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D.C.

7 October 1948

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn  
Assistant General Counsel  
Department of the Treasury  
Room 2000, Main Treasury Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Spingarn:

I want to express to you the deep appreciation of the services for your interest in the counter-intelligence field and for the time which you have given in an endeavor to improve the organization in that activity.

The study of your recommendations has been completed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the conclusions of the Committee will now be considered by the individual services. You have given us much food for thought, and I am confident that a material improvement will result which will add significantly to our national set-up.

I hope to have an opportunity to have you for lunch in the not too distant future. As soon as the current pressure ends I shall give you a ring.

Sincerely,

/s/ Alfred M. Gruenther  
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Director, The Joint Staff

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A BASIC PROGRAM FOR THE VITALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL  
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ORGANIZATION (AND ITS LOWER  
ECHELONS) RELATING TO OVERSEAS COUNTER INTELLIGENCE  
IN TIME OF WAR, AND FOR THE CORRECTION OF SERIOUS  
DEFICIENCIES IN THIS ORGANIZATION AS DEMONSTRATED BY  
WORLD WAR II.

Stephen J. Spingarn  
Lt. Colonel, MI-Reserve  
(Commanding Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps,  
Fifth Army, 1943-1945)

April 1948

April 8, 1948

A BASIC PROGRAM FOR THE VITALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ORGANIZATION (AND ITS LOWER ECHELONS) RELATING TO OVERSEAS COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IN TIME OF WAR, AND FOR THE CORRECTION OF SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THIS ORGANIZATION AS DEMONSTRATED BY WORLD WAR II.\*

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this paper is to summarize briefly (1) the serious need for more effective military overseas counter intelligence (counter espionage, counter sabotage, counter subversion) in any possible war with the USSR (a war which it is earnestly hoped can be avoided)--a need far greater than the corresponding one of World War II; (2) the striking inadequacy of the Department of the Army central <sup>counter</sup> intelligence organization, and (3) basic recommendations for correcting this situation.

These recommendations are summarized as follows:

- (1) Take the dead hand of G-2 off counter intelligence and make it a Special Staff Section all the way from Division level up to the National Defense Establishment. Such a Section would also logically include secret intelligence, and, of course, CIC would operate under it as it has operated under G-2.
- (2) At the top directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish an omnibus counter intelligence and secret intelligence organization with a non-Regular officer of high rank (Lt. General) in charge (and a non-Regular Major General in charge of its counter intelligence arm) to direct counter intelligence and secret intelligence in all three services. Such an organization would be like OSS with this important difference -- it would

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\* This program does not include domestic counter intelligence since all significant phases of that work are handled by the FBI rather than the Defense Establishment (which has only the fairly pedestrian work of the security of its own personnel and establishment).

be tied in with the military services through the Special Staff Section at each echelon, rather than operating on the outside as did OSS. It would be further tied in by a policy of having some Regular career service officers (not above the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain) in second or third flight positions (but not first) at each echelon.

(3) Raise the level of counter intelligence (including CI and SCI, as well as CIC) rank from bottom to top--all CIC agents (other than clerks and service personnel) to be commissioned and top CI and CIC ranks in the theaters to run up through Brigadier General.

(4) Couple the above with (a) a sound recruiting program, together with provisions for ruthlessly weeding out men who do not measure up to CIC standards; (b) a realistic training program largely based on overseas CI, CIC, and SCI experience; (c) a firm directive according to CIC personnel the right to civilian status whether or not commissioned, but holding them responsible for confining the use of their privileges to operational necessities and not self-gratification; (d) a good central CI file in Washington with a well-policed directive that would make sure reports from the theaters got there and its own radio channels to the theaters; (e) a theater set-up recognizing the fact that CIC should give security service to geographical areas rather than to troop units, and should be extremely flexible in its personnel disposition possibilities in order to meet shifting patterns of enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversive penetration; and (f) encouragement of CIC to use imaginative and

irregular methods as necessary, being held responsible for results and the exercise of good judgment.

## II. THE SERIOUS NEED FOR BETTER COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

Although in World War II, U. S. Army Counter Intelligence received little training or direction worthy of the name from War Department, it was usually able to do its job in the field with a reasonable degree of adequacy for two main reasons: (1) It had the benefit of British CI knowledge overseas (all top European and Mediterranean theater CI officers were British) and the excellent British CI publications; and (2) it had the tremendous advantage of having no consequential enemy underground to cope with on its own side of the lines coupled with a large and vigorous pro-allied underground on the enemy's side. This latter was of immense help to both allied intelligence (espionage, sabotage, subversion) and counter intelligence. By radio pre-arrangement, allied officers and men, as well as our espionage and sabotage agents, were dropped at underground rendezvous points in enemy territory, and they directed and coordinated underground personnel and military formations, or worked with or through them. On the other hand, an enemy spy or saboteur who reached allied occupied territory could find few bases of support, so overwhelmingly pro-allied were the people of occupied Europe, including those of Italy, a former Axis-partner. Even in Germany and Austria there was no anti-allied underground of any consequence.

This happy situation cannot be expected to exist if we should have a war with the Soviets and their satellites. It is true that the British will again probably be on our side, although I do not think it is either safe or wise to assume that (nor does it seem



right that the most powerful nation in the world today should have to depend so heavily on another country in this vital field). But the underground situation will be quite changed. It will be remembered that the Italian underground in German territory was largely led and dominated by Communists, or extreme left wing Socialists of the Nenni variety who now make common cause with the Communists. They were the strongest, ablest, and most courageous leaders. In varying degrees, this was true of all the occupied countries of Europe. Moreover, although the proportions were less, a large number of the rank-and-file were also Communists or left wing Socialists.

The present situation in Europe, and elsewhere makes it clear that this situation would, to a large extent, be reversed if we should go to war with the USSR. While there would, no doubt, be a pro-allied underground on their side, it would be puny indeed in comparison with the pro-Soviet underground and sympathizers on our side. The consequent potentialities of enemy espionage, sabotage and subversion behind our lines are very great.

To the foregoing should be added the fact that we are confronted today with a centrally directed, world-wide espionage, sabotage, and subversion network which is perhaps unparalleled in history. A counter intelligence officer is (at least professionally) compelled to admire the espionage, sabotage, and subversion potentialities of the Soviet-Cominform set-up with its ready-made spies, saboteurs, and fifth columnists in the form of the local Communist Party in virtually every nation on the face of the globe. Couple this with the secret intelligence services of the Soviet military establishment and the MVD (as highlighted by the 1946 Report of the Canadian Royal

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Commission on the Gouzenko cases) and it is clear that we are confronted with a clandestine, centrally directed, world-wide intelligence organization of massive proportions.

The efforts of the German Abwehr and the SD, both in this country and overseas, during the last war seem puny in comparison. Indeed, it does not seem to be an overstatement to say that the counter intelligence job of World War III (if such a war should take place) will make the corresponding job in World War II look like child's play.

### III. THE INADEQUACY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

To deal competently with the job that may lie ahead, U. S. Military Counter Intelligence will have to be well-trained, strong, alert, intelligent and imaginative. This will require good central leadership and planning by top men who thoroughly understand counter intelligence, its principles and its practices, as well as its possibilities and its impossibilities, and who know a good deal about the secret intelligence services (espionage, sabotage, subversion, MO, counter espionage, etc.) of other powers both enemy and allied -- as much for example as we knew in World War II about the Abwehr, the SD, and the RSHA (the German military and party secret intelligence services). Top Counter Intelligence leaders should not (as at present is the case) be career military men, since experience has demonstrated that able career officers regard Intelligence only as a waypost to top commands (example: General Vandenberg), and less able career officers cannot do the job.

Do we have such military counter intelligence leadership today? It is believed that the answer is clearly "No". This answer could be documented at considerable length, but in an outline of this

(4) The fact that counter intelligence operated under G-2 and that G-2s had received no consequential training in counter intelligence and for the most part quite understandably very little interest -- combat intelligence being its major field of interest.

The last item really poses the dilemma of counter intelligence. It is a small and rather poorly regarded unit under G-2. The G-2 is trained in combat intelligence in staff and command schools. Obviously he gets no CI training of any consequence since there is none to be had. (And there is as much difference between combat intelligence and counter intelligence as there is between the engineers and the signal corps, for example.) Combat intelligence is the G-2's daily bread and butter in action. His Commanding General and Chief of Staff press him hard for it. Air photographic reconnaissance, combat patrol information, PW interrogation -- these he understands and values. But counter intelligence is to him something vague and incomprehensible; necessary, of course, but not to be compared with a good solid piece of information on enemy dispositions or movements. The only phase of CI and CIC which the average G-2 really understands (and I am talking about competent, hard-working G-2's who do a good job otherwise), is its most pedestrian side, the security of military headquarters, installations, and information. Counter espionage (or counter subversion) he thinks of as something out of E. Phillips Oppenheim. But it is not, it is a hard-working job with the usual quota of 99% perspiration and 1% of inspiration.

Thus the CIC in the field frequently gets along quite nicely with its G-2 in a sense because it is likely to be left pretty much alone while the G-2 focusses on his more important problems of combat

intelligence. But in a more valid sense, the CIC lacks the top-level understanding and support which will be necessary for it to accomplish its job when the going gets tough. This set-up was good enough for World War II. It is quite clear that it will not be good enough for World War III for the reasons indicated under II above.

The lowly status of counter intelligence is illustrated by the fact that there was no CIC or CI staff officer above the rank of Colonel in either War Department, ETO, or MTO, as of the end of World War II. It is encouraging that the CIC Chief is now a Brigadier General but it is only a step in the right direction. Moreover, the Chief of Counter Intelligence planning and thinking in the Department of the Army is still only a Colonel (the same officer who has held this post for the last 5 or 6 years).

There were no regular Army officers in CI or CIC during World War II as far as I am aware (with possibly one or two isolated exceptions). This was true because it was a dead-end for the regular Army man -- no possibilities of advancement above Colonel and no training of general value for other assignments.

It is still pretty much of a dead-end. I doubt whether a regular who aspired to two-, three-, four-, or five-star rank would want a CIC or CI assignment except as a temporary peace-time waypost.

By its very nature then (I think), CI and CIC will continue to be staffed and manned largely by civilian soldiers, who will for the most part wish to return to their civil jobs when a war ends. But they will need some signs of top-level understanding and interest in their organization and work if they are to be expected to do a job. I am not overstating things when I say that almost all CIC I know (and I am speaking particularly of the most intelligent, thinking

members of the outfit) believe that top counter intelligence leadership during World War II was incompetent.

(5) Possibly the most serious mark against War Department Counter Intelligence during World War II was its failure to create a central counter intelligence file, such as the British counter intelligence kept.

Most of our CI and CIC reports never reached Washington during the war because of unfortunate theater restrictions and because of lack of imagination or interest on the part of War Department CI. I now find that field CIC files are apparently scattered and lost. War Department itself does not know where they are. As a fine British handbook on CI put it, files are the bullets of the counter intelligence Army. A piece of information on espionage in Argentine may tie in with information from Portugal and Egypt (we had instances like that at Fifth Army CIC). Under our World War II military counter intelligence setup, there was no chance for such information to be put together, evaluated, and proper dissemination and action taken.

There must be a central file where such information goes expeditiously, and is collated, evaluated, and disseminated for information and for necessary further investigations around the world. There should be direct-channel radio access to this central file (for file checks and information) by CI and CIC all over the world. British counter intelligence had such a set-up during the war. Our own OSS also had it to a limited extent; the limitation being that their central CI files were of negligible value. To set up such a file would require two things: (1) a directive to all theaters that

a copy of every CI, CIC, SCI, and other counter intelligence report of any consequence be sent in the most expeditious manner to the central CI file in Washington; such a directive would have to be policed since G-2's and Commanders are allergic to this because they fear that reports will thus go to Washington which in some manner may embarrass them; and (2) highly qualified personnel of college graduate school caliber (and with actual experience in operational counter intelligence) to set up and operate the central file effectively.

Today more than ever before, our counter intelligence must be on a centrally-directed world-wide basis if it is to cope with its centrally-directed world-wide antagonist. A central file is the heart and brain of such a counter intelligence organization.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

##### A. Procedural

A serious and objective appraisal study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other appropriate agency in the Executive Branch of the Government (made through persons who are not currently members of the intelligence divisions of their respective services) of the adequacy and competence of the intelligence organizations of all three services, and of the extent to which they <sup>have</sup> ~~are~~ planned for and are ready to meet their indicated responsibilities in another war if it should occur. Such a study should include consideration of the substantive recommendations below. As a preliminary to this study, selected CI, CIC, and SCI veterans with extensive overseas experience on the one hand and top War Department CI and Intelligence Division personnel on the other should be invited to present their views on the counter intelligence set-up and how it can be improved. While the

program incorporated in this paper relates essentially to counter intelligence; it would be most desirable to include in connection with any such study a similar appraisal of the adequacy and competence of the projected military secret intelligence organization which would carry on this type of work in any future war. As already indicated, secret intelligence (espionage, sabotage, MO, etc.) is much more closely related to counter intelligence than it is to combat intelligence.

B. Substantive

(1) A single three-service military counter intelligence organization should be set up under an able non-Regular officer with the rank of Major General (and with extensive experience in foreign counter intelligence as distinguished from G-2 combat intelligence) as one major arm of an omnibus secret intelligence service (somewhat similar to OSS) which would operate under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which would also handle espionage, sabotage, subversion, MO, and intelligence research and analysis, as distinguished from G-2 and its combat intelligence. This omnibus organization should be headed up by a vigorous, intelligent, and imaginative non-Regular officer of outstanding general competence. The job should carry the rank of Lt. General, and the man selected for it (like his principal subordinates) should go into it with the understanding that that was his job for the duration (if he made good) and not a stepping stone to a major combat or other command. In time of war this organization should take over all the operational work of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the counter intelligence side, this organization should be staffed almost exclusively with CI, CIC, and SCI personnel with extensive overseas service during World War II.

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In each of the three services, all counter intelligence and secret intelligence should be taken out of the Intelligence Organization and set up at all levels from the Defense Establishment on down as a Special Staff Section on a level with G-2, A-2, and ONI. (Compare in this connection the war-time French Military Intelligence set-up, in which counter intelligence (Securite Militaire (or SM) was a Special Staff Section on a level with and not under G-2 (Deuxieme Bureau)).

This Special Staff Section arrangement at all echelons would correct what was probably the major flaw in the OSS setup: OSS was virtually outside of the regular military establishment. While this was a great advantage at the Washington level (where OSS operated under the Joint Chiefs of Staff), <sup>it</sup> was a serious disadvantage in the theaters of operation. Thus, while it is necessary to pitch a counter intelligence and secret intelligence organization at a high level if it is to be effective, it is also necessary to tie it in closely with the regular military establishment in time of war. The Special Staff Section described above would accomplish this. Coupled with this there should be a substantial number of Regular career service officers at all levels of the counter intelligence and secret intelligence organization. These Regulars should hold second and third echelon posts at different levels in the organization, carrying rank not above that of Colonel or Naval Captain. ~~They~~ There should not be top men at any echelon.

Being Regulars, of course it would be expected that there would be a steady rotation of these officers in and out of the new Intelligence organization. They would constitute a bridge between it and the Regular Military Establishment.



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(1a) This is an alternative to (1) above, restricted to the Army. This recommendation would involve taking Counter Intelligence and Secret Intelligence out of Intelligence in the Department of the Army and setting it up as a Special Staff Section (with the same scope as in (1) above) under an able and imaginative non-Regular officer not below the rank of Major General, who as in (1) above would go into the job with the definite understanding that this was his post for the duration (unless he failed), and who would be supported by an experienced CI, CIC, and SCI staff, with some Regular military personnel in the second and third echelon posts. Lower echelons of the Army would be similarly reorganized. CIA personnel in theaters of operation would work under this Special Staff Section during time of war.

(2) The whole level of CI, CIC, and SCI rank should be raised with a view of attracting top-notch non-Regular personnel who would be content to make their permanent military career in this field alone and -- in some cases -- remain there in time of peace as well as war. Such a lift should begin at the bottom. All CIC personnel (except clerks and service personnel) should be commissioned officers. A man who is not of officer caliber is (with rare exceptions) not worth having in CIC. Generally speaking, CIC enlisted agents were basically much better qualified than their officers at the beginning of World War II (and I speak as a man who went into World War II as an officer). Thus, one not infrequently saw the ludicrous spectacle of a highly qualified CIC sergeant (A.B., M.A., Ph.D., Rhodes Scholar, 5-languages, brilliant intellect, to cite an actual case) under the command of a CIC officer of only average intelligence and ability.

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Fortunately, late in the war it was possible to commission (battle-field or direct) a good many of the better CIC enlisted men. However, because of the long tie-up in CIC's Table of Organization, the men who were thus commissioned were not able to rise above the company grades and the vast majority of them ended the war as 1st and 2nd lieutenants.

Counter intelligence staff officers should be selected from men with extensive overseas experience either in counter intelligence staff work, in CIC, in SCI, or in comparable work.

If counter intelligence is to do an adequate job in another war, the whole system of recruiting personnel for CIC (the operational arm of counter intelligence) should be recanvassed in the light of World War II experience. My information from personal overseas counter intelligence sources is that recent CIC replacements have been far below the caliber of the men who were brought in during the last war, and even during the last war at least 25 percent of the personnel brought in were inferior and unsatisfactory. It is natural that there should be a slump in the caliber of personnel recruited since the war ended, but the time has come to correct this situation.

Generally speaking, first emphasis in recruiting should be based on general, all-around intelligence, knowledge, and judgment. Normally speaking, college graduate caliber personnel should be sought but the recruiting pattern should be sufficiently flexible to admit men whose educational background is not college level but who have other special qualifications (such as linguistic ability coupled with exceptional competence in criminal enforcement investigation work, for example, as a crack member of the Alien and Subversive Squad of

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the New York Police Department).

Major but secondary emphasis should be placed on linguistic ability and knowledge of foreign countries. A good man can learn a language but a linguist without intelligence or ability will never be of much value except as a mouthpiece for an abler man. However, at least 50 percent of all operating counter intelligence personnel should be linguists.

There should be express provisions for ruthlessly weeding out counter intelligence personnel who demonstrate that they do not measure up to standards. In World War II there was no such provision, and inferior, unsatisfactory personnel had to be carried because they could not be gotten rid of by CIC. In some instances, this resulted in CIC receiving a black eye from the activities of such men. There is probably no organization in the Army which is under greater corrupting pressure overseas than CIC. Men of character and integrity are needed to resist these pressures.

One thing should be made very clear in recruiting CIC and that is that operating counter intelligence overseas in a war is a hard-working, 12 or 14 hours a day, 7 days a week job, a great deal of the time. It is no place for hedonists, grandstand players, or men who join CIC because they have read E. Phillips Oppenheim and think that their work will be carried on at champagne suppers in luxurious apartments under the ministrations of luscious blondes. There were perhaps too many men of this character in CIC during World War II, but to some extent this was the fault of some of their officers because many a good man could work hard or play hard depending on the example which was set him. As indicated below, CIC must have certain

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special privileges which the rest of the Army does not enjoy if it is to cope effectively with the unorthodox techniques of enemy agents. But it must never forget that those privileges are for operational purposes and not for its own self-gratification.

The top as well as the bottom level of counter intelligence ranks should be lifted. Thus, it should be possible for some CI and CIC officers to make Brigadier General and in major theaters of operation, the top counter intelligence staff officer could well be a Major General.

(3) CIC personnel, whether commissioned or enlisted, should be accorded civilian status, assimilated to officer status, and be entitled to wear either the civilian uniform or civilian clothes as necessary for their current operation. Since civilian status cannot be turned on and off like a water faucet, it must be protected consistently and it should not be jeopardized by conflicting arrangements for messing and billeting, travel orders, morning reports, or otherwise.

Even if all CIC were commissioned, I would still urge civilian status for them since during World War II we found this status more useful than commissioned rank, (at least through the company grades) in a combat theater. The civilian status of CIC with Fifth Army was one of the major reasons for any successes which that organization had in Italy. Actually, it was an admission by the Army that all CIC should be commissioned but that a proper Table of Organization just couldn't be worked out. In line with the previous recommendation, CIC should be made responsible for not abusing the privileges that go with civilian status.

Civilian status and the right to wear a civilian uniform or

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clothes as operationally necessary should be made a matter of firm Department of the Army directive to all theaters. This directive should specify the exact nature of the civilian uniform (U. S. insignia on the collar lapels, officer-style cap, shirt, etc., no insignia of rank) and should also specify the various ways in which the civilian status should be protected from disclosure (i.e., on military orders, in connection with messing, billeting, morning reports, etc.).

(4) By directives and otherwise, the Department of the Army should exercise greater control over CIC and CI in theaters of operation than was done in World War II. This would (a) prevent misuse of CIC by combat commanders or G-2s not familiar with the CIC mission (as for example was the case with respect to the 34th Division CIC under Fifth Army throughout most of the Italian campaign); and (b) result in a better CIC and CI training program in the U.S.

(5) The CI and CIC training program should be realistic, should be based largely on overseas work and not domestic CIC investigating, and should be given by the pick of the available CI, CIC, and SCI officers with extensive overseas experience, plus experienced counter intelligence officers from England and other Friendly Powers. CIC should also receive the equivalent of three months basic infantry training with special emphasis on map work and knowledge of Army line and staff set-ups, but not commando or equivalent training. Brains, judgment and knowledge are what good CIC need and there is little enough time to teach them the CIC job without trying to make commandos out of them. Specifically, in addition to language training and foreign service style area training (which would give

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counter intelligence personnel the story of the geography, history, people, politics, customs, and economics of the country to which they were going) counter intelligence personnel should receive instruction in the following things, among others:

(a) All known details about the organization and operations of both enemy and allied secret intelligence and counter intelligence services and other related organizations. In the case of the enemy organizations, this should include such material as we got in the excellent British handbooks on the German Abwehr, SD, and the RSHA, supplemented with any known information on their actual operations and personalities in specific countries. With respect to allied organizations, (examples: SCI, SI, SO, MO, and R and .., branches of OSS; MI-5; FSS; MI-6; SOE; "A" Force; SM; TR; BST; SR; PWB; Civil Censorship; IPW; CSDIC; MII; SIM; (CS); AMG; Military Police; etc.,) counter intelligence personnel should know not only what each organization does but <sup>what</sup> its relationship to the work of the others is, and this should be true with respect to U.S. intelligence and counter intelligence outfits as well as others. It has been startling sometimes to discover how little many CIC knew about such matters as the penetration and deception aspects of counter espionage. It was not their fault. They were simply never taught it, although they should have been.

(b) Since files are all-important in counter intelligence, CIC and CI training should include instruction in how to set up counter intelligence files and how to use them. This is not a simple matter and should not be treated in the off-hand fashion in which files are all too often treated. Good files are the heart of counter

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intelligence. In several instances, Fifth Army CIC caught spies right out of its files without any investigative work. File training should include instruction on the theory and practice of information dissemination.

(c) Operating counter intelligence should be taught by experienced personnel the various aspects of the counter intelligence mission at various levels, Division, Corps, Army, Army Group, Theater, Base Section, Border Control, etc.

(d) CIC personnel should be taught the practical aspects of such problems, as how to go into a newly captured city or area and set up a CIC office, establish a network of official and unofficial informants and get into operation within a matter of hours, and they should also be taught what the various types of counter intelligence controls are and how to operate them, how to set up and operate an "S" Force or "T" Force, how to set up a coast watching service, how to prepare good, lucid, complete, but boiled-down reports (not the CI-RI), and not least of all how to billet, mess, move, and otherwise handle a separate detached unit like CIC.

(e) As a very important part of their training they should be taught by persons who have interrogated spies the theory and practice of successful counter espionage interrogation. This is an art all of its own and requires a lot of practice, training, and most of all detailed knowledge. It is the cornerstone of operational foreign counter intelligence in time of war. In this respect counter intelligence is just the reverse of criminal investigation work. In the latter case you have a crime and try to find the criminal. In the typical counter intelligence situation, you have your suspected

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criminal and are trying to prove that there has been a crime (i.e., espionage, etc.).

(f) Perhaps most important of all, counter intelligence personnel should be taught what the basic theory of all counter intelligence is. Summarizing this in oversimplified fashion, one can state that the whole theory of all operational counter intelligence is to create the maximum number of controls possible with available personnel and resources in the light of the existing conditions and terrain, coupled with the most extensive informational network possible, with the objective that persons attempting to evade such controls or otherwise engaging in irregular patterns of activity (and enemy agents must necessarily engage in irregular patterns of activity), though they may not be immediately detected and captured, will nevertheless be picked up eventually by the counter intelligence radar-style network of controls and informants. This involves in effect, a series of controls and gradually narrowing screening processes principally designed as the end result to bring major suspects up against the counter espionage service's best trained and best informed CE interrogators.

(6) A central counter intelligence file should be established in the manner and for the purpose indicated in III, Item (5), above. There should also be a theater counter intelligence file in each theater. By Department of the Army directive, provision should be made for rapid and direct transmission of CI information within theaters and across theater lines without going up through several echelons in one theater and down the other. Counter intelligence should have its own radio network tied in with direct access to theater and Washington central CI files.



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(7) The basic concept entertained by War Department CI during the last war that CIC give security service to troop units (rather than to geographical areas) should be sharply revised. Some security service to troop units is necessary but this is unimportant work from the CI standpoint and should be held to a minimum so that the bulk of the always inadequate number of available CIC can be moved about flexibly as needed to meet ever changing patterns of enemy espionage and sabotage penetration.

The need for highly flexible disposition of CIC was never better illustrated than with Fifth Army in Italy between October 10, 1944, and May 2, 1945 -- a period of 200 days of German mass espionage attack during which approximately 300 German agents were caught in Fifth Army area, about 90 percent by CIC. During this period over half of all our available CIC were tied up by permanent attachments to II Corps and its Divisions, although IV Corps and its Divisions were covering an area 6 or 8 times the size of the II Corps area, and through this thinly-held IV Corps area (naturally) came some 95 percent of the 300 enemy agents who were caught, since it was very difficult to cross the lines in the tightly-held, hard-fought II Corps area which was the axis of Fifth Army's attack then. It was obvious that the need for CIC was in the large, thinly-held holding-front area, and not where the sharpest fighting was going on, but the inflexible arrangements for attachment of CIC to troop units and the objections of their Division and Corps G-2s to their removal made it impossible to put CIC of II Corps and its Divisions where they were most needed.

To correct this situation, Corps and <sup>Division</sup>~~Army~~ CIC units should be

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cut to the bone, and the majority of all tactical CIC should operate under Army or even Army Group, forming a pool of CIC agents with which to cover flexibly Division, Corps, and Army areas, as most needed at any given time.

It should always be remembered that an enemy agent does not recognize arbitrary military jurisdictional compartments as delimited by Division, Corps, Army, Army Group, or even theater boundaries. If the counter spy is hampered and restricted by these boundaries, his effectiveness is heavily cut.

Behind Army Group boundaries (that is to say in Base Section areas), and in Occupational Zones, CIC should operate under the top headquarters (theater or Zone), rather than being parcelled out to troop units or subordinate commands. The reasons for this are the same as above.

(8) CIC should be encouraged to use imaginative and irregular methods as necessary. They should be held responsible only for results and for the use of good judgment. Enemy agents operate in unorthodox ways and they cannot be caught in quintuplicate "through channels". GI-minded officers should not be permitted to cripple CIC. A GI CIC is not worth the space it occupies or the food it eats.

Stephen J. Spingarn  
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(Note: The views expressed are personal and are based on three years overseas service, and two invasions in three countries as a CIC officer (October 1942-October 1945). Of this period

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2-1/2 years were with Fifth Army CIC, the last two years, including the Italian campaign from Salerno to Brenner Pass (with waystops at Cassino, Anzio, the Arno, and the Apennines), as commanding officer of that unit. Division, Corps, and Army components of CIC with Fifth Army captured over 500 trained German spies and saboteurs launched by the Abwehr, the SD, and the RSHA, the largest number, it is believed, captured by any allied Army. These figures do not include such small fry as Gestapo informants, household help and mistresses of the various enemy intelligence services, or German collaborators. Several thousand security suspects were arrested and interned by CIC with Fifth Army in addition to the actual bona fide enemy agents. During my service with Fifth Army I also worked with and at different times commanded, supervised and coordinated British, Canadian, New Zealand, French, Brazilian, and Italian counter intelligence officers and men. At the request of British intelligence, I lectured in a British counter intelligence training school.)

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ADDENDUM OF APRIL 16, 1948:

The substance of this paper up to this point was completed on April 8, 1948, which was the day prior to the events at Bogota, Colombia, which temporarily broke up the Pan-American conference. Those events have certainly highlighted "the serious need for better counter intelligence" which is the heading of Part II of this paper.

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On April 12, Secretary Marshall publicly indicated his belief that the USSR and the Communists were responsible for the Bogota uprising. He stated among other things: "This situation must not be judged on a local basis, however \* \* \* this is a world affair--not merely Colombian or Latin-American". On the same day Governor Dewey, of New York (according to an AP despatch), in a radio address stated that the Colombian revolution was "a shameful example of unbelievable incompetence \* \* \*. We apparently had no idea what was going on in a country just 2 hours bomber flying time from the Panama Canal".

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Washington Post of April 9, 1948, reported that Mr. John Foster Dulles, leading foreign policy expert and a principal adviser of Governor Dewey, had outlined to Secretary Marshall just before he left for Bogota a plan which would "include detection of subversive activities, espionage and counter espionage, counter-propaganda and assistance to democratic movements, including aid to any organization of underground movements in nations already controlled by Communists".

On April 15 a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, composed of Representative Brown of Ohio, Chairman; Representative Hoffman of Michigan (who is Chairman of the full Committee); and Representative McCormack of Massachusetts began an investigation of the CIA to learn whether or not the Secretary of State and other high officials were properly warned that a revolution was impending in Colombia. The first witness scheduled at these hearings was Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of CIA.

The newspapers of April 16 report Admiral Hillenkoetter's

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testimony (the hearing was in executive session, but following it Chairman Brown read the Admiral's testimony to reporters). According to the press reports, the CIA Director told the Subcommittee that beginning at least as far back as January 2, 1948, CIA had sent a series of reports to the State Department indicating the "possibility of violence and an outbreak aimed primarily at embarrassing officials of the U. S." He said that on March 23 (only a week before the Conference was to start) CIA agents in Colombia found out that Communists were planning "manifestations and personal molestations" against the U. S. delegates. He indicated that this report did not reach Washington, however, because a State Department man in Colombia (to whom it was given by CIA agents) blocked it because he did not want to alarm the U. S. delegates who were about to arrive.

This paper has been addressed to United States Military Counter Intelligence overseas in time of war. The April 9 uprising in Colombia certainly suggests the possible desirability of placing under careful and objective scrutiny our "peacetime" counter intelligence and secret intelligence organizations as well as our wartime organization in this field to determine whether or not the United States is adequately prepared for all eventualities in this vital area. Such scrutiny should include not merely its ability to collect information, but also its ability to get that information rapidly to Washington, and its ability there to properly evaluate the information received and to get it into the hands of the top officials (including the President) who will need it in order to plan and act intelligently in every field of foreign relations and policy.

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The Pan-American Conference in Bogota has been scheduled for a long time, perhaps a year. The importance which the United States placed on this conference is evident from the fact that the Secretary of State and two other Cabinet officers were to attend it. It is obvious that the CIA does not have sufficient personnel to spread them in any quantity across every country on the globe, but it would seem good intelligence generalship would indicate that the enemy or possible enemy should be confronted in force at the most critical points. It would thus seem worthwhile inquiring how many topnotch CIA agents (whose background and experience qualified them for intelligence work in Colombia -- notably fluency in Spanish, knowledge of the politics and people of the country, and the knowledge and personality necessary to make effective contact with the anti-Communist liberal and labor groups in Colombia who might be expected to have the best information on the Communist situation there) have been drifting down toward Colombia during the past 6 months or so. Moreover, it is axiomatic in secret intelligence that the point from which information is desired is not necessarily the only good point, or even the best point, from which to obtain it. Revolutionist dissidents, and expatriates in other countries frequently have their own secret pipelines to underground organizations in the country of their origin. Thus, it might well be that good information on subversive movements in Colombia could be collected not only in Colombia, but in, let us say, Cuba, Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay, for example. It is not too much to expect that an alert and effective central intelligence organization would know where and how these pipelines of information ran and where they could be best tapped.

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It would similarly seem worthwhile for the appropriate Executive Branch authorities to examine the CIA's operational plans for, let us say, the next year to determine what CIA regards as the critical points in the Intelligence and Counter Intelligence "war" during the period and how it plans to handle them, particularly in terms of what CIA personnel (how many and who) will go where (or are already there) to do the necessary work on the ground.

In the same connection, it would be worthwhile determining what exploitation CIA (not to mention the National Defense Establishment) is giving to numerous excellent sources of information currently available in the form of ex-Premier, ex-Cabinet Ministers and other former officials and nationals of potential enemy countries.

It would also seem desirable to determine what are the qualifications of the men who collate and evaluate CIA reports in Washington.

Most important of all perhaps would be an examination of CIA's ability to get information rapidly from the point of collection to Washington, there evaluate it properly, and then place it in the hands of the top policy-making officer or officers to whom it should go.

The reports of Admiral Hillenkoetter's testimony suggest that CIA may have competently discharged its collection of information function in Colombia. It is not clear how good its evaluation of this information was. It seems fairly certain that CIA did not have the ability to get its information in properly evaluated form rapidly to the top policy-making officer concerned.

In this last connection, note the comments in the body of this paper about the failure of the War Department to set up a central

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Counter Intelligence File during World War II, and the observation that the establishment of such a file would require a well-policed directive to all theaters that copies of CI, CIC, and SCI reports be sent directly to Washington by the most expeditious means. I indicated that policing of such a directive was necessary because Commanders and their G-2s always feared that reports of this character going out of their theaters (or commands) might somehow embarrass them.

The events of Bogota suggest that Ambassadors are no different than Generals in this respect.

From personal knowledge I know that at the spade-work level (that is, the men who are doing the job on the ground overseas) the CIA is recruiting some very high-caliber personnel. Thus, three outstanding CIC agents who served two to three years with me overseas in Italy, North Africa and Austria are now working for CIA abroad. These three men between them have 7 college degrees, including 2 M.A.'s and a Ph.D., speak an average of 6 languages apiece, and have had an average of over 4 years actual experience overseas in several countries in performing counter espionage, counter sabotage, and counter subversion functions. Each one of them has personally captured and interrogated large numbers of enemy agents and each is thoroughly familiar with the business of setting up an intelligence informational network. They are also familiar with both the theory and practice of all major aspects of counter intelligence and secret intelligence and they are keen students of Communism and its many subversive manifestations in different countries.



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On the other hand, the Director of CIA is a regular Navy Rear Admiral and the Deputy Director a regular Army Brigadier General. In the light of recent events it seems pertinent to inquire about the extent of their knowledge and experience in the field of counter intelligence and secret intelligence, both theory and practice; and whether or not they plan to remain in this field indefinitely or hope to move on to other assignments in their respective services.

One further footnote. The body of this paper deals principally with military overseas counter intelligence in time of war. However, it should be remembered that in neutral countries in time of war, and, in time of peace, in all foreign countries that are not actually unfriendly, as well as in occupational zones, secret intelligence and counter intelligence -- espionage and counter espionage -- to a large extent tend to merge and to lose their separate identities. For present purposes, therefore, the question as to the adequacy of our secret intelligence and counter intelligence organizations (whether military or civilian) is largely indivisible.

Finally, we should never overlook one terrible truth. A highly competent top-level central secret intelligence and counter intelligence organization is an essential need of any major power that expects to survive in an atomic age -- in time of peace as well as war. But any such organization has great potentialities for evil as well as good. Witness the Police States: Russia with its MVD (once the NKVD and before that the OGPU); and Germany with its RSHA (under which operated the Gestapo and the SD, as well as -- at the end -- the Abwehr).

It is imperative, therefore, that the men who head up secret intelligence and counter intelligence agencies of the United States should be selected not only for their qualifications in this field, but also for their known devotion to this country and its constitutional traditions and liberties -- men who are not extremists either of the left or right. In consonance with these constitutional traditions, such agencies should be headed by civilians, and should be under direct civilian control except during the period of an actual "shooting" war.

To sum up: A careful examination (by appropriate Executive Branch authorities) is needed of our whole secret intelligence and counter intelligence machine to determine its adequacy in the vital field of national intelligence and security. Such an examination should be made by well-qualified persons without doctrinaire biases. It should be carried on in well-guarded secrecy. But (and this is an important caveat), the agencies under scrutiny must not be permitted to raise the bar of "secrecy" and "security" to prevent or obstruct a searching analysis of their ability and competence to perform effectively their assigned functions.